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Abstract: The global economic crisis and the crisis in the euro zone exposed the 
deep differences of opinion between German economists and scientists from Anglo-
Saxon countries. The German approach conceptually differs in the views on the 
strategies and tools of anti-crisis policy, especially fiscal stimulus in the Keynes-
ian-style, quantitative easing monetary policy of the ECB, the question of financial 
assistance to Greece and restructuring its debt. The other areas of difference are 
the approach to the rules in macroeconomic policy, fiscal consolidation, and inter-
pretation of current account surplus. Given the size and performance of the Ger-
man economy it is important to understand the reasons f r these opposites, which 
constitute the research goal of this article. Considerations are based on the thesis 
that ordoliberal thought still has a strong impact on the practice of macroeconom-
ic policy in Germany and also at the European level. The analysis is built on the 
short overview of ideological foundations of the German social market economy 
and its most important postulates, which then will be applied for interpretation of 
intellectual distinctions between economists from Germany and other countries in 
the theoretical and practical dimensions of the economic policy observed in Eu-
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rope. The methodology includes the critical literature studies and the comparative 





The crisis in the euro zone and the earlier 2007–2008 global financial crisis 
has highlighted the differences between the position of Germany and other 
countries including international organizations (Balcerzak, 2009a, pp. 257-
274). The points of disagreement concern not only macroeconomic policy 
instruments to help overcome the recession but also its intellectual founda-
tions, European design and European institutions. Oe can indicate in brief: 
a reluctance to stimulate the economy by Keynesian-type instruments, poli-
cy based on rules, philosophy of politics at the leve  of economic order and 
the primacy of monetary policy. Given the dominant economic and political 
position of Germany in Europe, these differences ar crucial for resolving 
the euro zone crisis and for the process of further int gration. Their under-
standing require looking through the prism of economic theory in historical 
perspective. The line of argumentation is based on the assumption that the 
ordoliberal thought still exerts a strong influence on the practice of macroe-
conomic policy in Germany and at the European level as well. This is due 
to the fact that the ordoliberal ideas still make th intellectual base for the 
great part of decision-makers and influential economists in Germany. In the 
literature this is referred to as the “long shadow” cast by ordoliberalism 
(Dullien & Guérot, 2012). Only in 2005 some authors (Allen, 2005, pp. 
199-221) indicated that the German ordoliberalism indeed won the war 
against Keynesianism, but it may be influenced by Anglo-Saxon version of 
neoliberalism. Meanwhile, in the face of the problems in the euro zone, it 
turned out that the representation of ordoliberal ideas is so strong that their 
representatives have a position of a player with veo power, blocking other 
solutions (Young, 2015, pp. 78-90). Germany has adhered to the principles 
of its policy for a long time and today's disputes r present a new develop-
ment of debate held throughout the period after World War II. 
The paper consists of three main parts. Firstly, the main theses of 
ordoliberalism are outlined which are juxtaposed with the proposals of 
Keynesianism as two competing doctrines of post-war Germany’s econom-
ics and economic policy. Then the main areas of conli t between German 
economists and the representatives of Anglo-Saxon mai stream economics 
are collected. The implications of these differences for macroeconomic 
policy in the context of the euro zone crisis will be the subject of the third 
part. The study ends up with a set of conclusions.  
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Method of the Research 
 
The paper is based on the critical study of literature and analysis of eco-
nomic doctrines, mainly ordoliberalism, Keynesianism and – to a lesser 
degree – monetarism. Contemporary discussion on macroeconomic policy 
is interpreted as a continuation of the historically conditioned binding of 
economics with the practice of economic policy. Fora better understanding 
of the relative autonomy of German economic thought some components of 
historical analysis and comparative analysis of macroeconomic policy were 
used. To illustrate the main areas of dispute, the major theses of representa-
tives from the ordoliberal and Anglo-Saxon circles were quoted. 
 
 
Ordoliberalism versus Keynesianism in Economic Thought 
and Economic Policy of Post-war Germany  
 
Economists and lawyers from the stream of ordoliberal thought already in 
the 1930s asked the question about the desirable shape of the economic 
order and called for a strong, but limited, in terms of decision-making, 
state. Its main task would be to create and to guard an economic order, 
within the framework of which smooth market processes could occur. They 
stood at the same time in opposition to unbridled laisse-fair capitalism and 
collectivism. After the second world war the Keynesianism was regarded 
by them as an interventionist doctrine that can lead to socialism, which in 
turn would mean, in accordance with the title of the famous work of Hayek 
Road to Serfdom, the loss of freedom. Both German business and a feeral 
minister of economics L. Erhard were reluctant about Allies’ administrative 
approach to the economy and promoted the most libera  policy in Europe 
under the banner of the Social Market Economy (SME). The “new liberals” 
(a term coined by A. Rüstow) from Freiburg school, already having a ready 
proposal for the political system, implemented main elements of their pro-
gram forming the basis of West German economic order. Admittedly, SME 
model, built on the basis of ordoliberal demands for years of L. Erhard’s 
tenure (1948-1966), was subject to significant evoluti n over time, but 
politics in post-war Germany was oriented consistently on a few key objec-
tives: 
− the primacy of monetary policy according to the Euckenian constitutive 
principle of competitive order, 
− opening the German economy to the global markets, which would ab-
sorb German exports, 
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− the promotion of market competition through the creation of institution-
al framework of competitive economic order, 
− limitation of the scope of state intervention and the desire to use the 
instruments in line with market logic (marktkonform). 
To understand today's debate on the objectives and tools of the macroe-
conomic policy, one should get to know the place and role of Keynesian 
ideas in the post-war economic history of Germany. It turns out they have 
never taken roots enough to get a lasting impact on the thinking of econom-
ic and political elites of this country. In the development of Keynesianism 
in the science of economics in post-war West Germany several main stages 
can be distinguished (Bombach et. al., 1985, pp. 9-17). Friction between 
Keynesianism and ordoliberalism set certain development stages of SME 
model in Germany. 
The first phase of Keynesianism, which lasted until 1956, included 
a traditional concept of demand-side measures in the sense of overall con-
trol, which has been developing in clear opposition  the ordoliberal ap-
proach, represented mainly by Eucken, Erhard and their proponents. In the 
macroeconomic policy these ideas have not been reflect d due to the domi-
nant position of the CDU party, which was a carrier of ordoliberal program. 
In the second phase the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and 
the trade unions (DGB) tried to implement the policy of economic stimula-
tion in their programs. During a period of full employment achieved in the 
early sixties they were convinced that this is a good tool for a time of inevi-
table decline. In 1965 Germany survived the first post-war recession, which 
opened the way for political changes, among other tings Erhard’s resigna-
tion from the office of Federal Chancellor in December 1966. This enabled 
the social democratic politician K. Schiller to introduce the Stability and 
Growth Law in 1967 (Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz). During this peri-
od, the academic world fully turned towards Keynesian and neoclassical 
synthesis in the US version, which, however, quickly raised concerns. The 
law officially imposed on government implementation f the “magic rec-
tangle” including: full employment, price stability, steady growth and ex-
ternal balance. Schiller argued that the government is just concerned about 
the macroeconomic indicators, but on the microeconomic level the players 
will continue to enjoy full freedom in conducting their activities. He de-
scribed the new policy with the famous formula “Synthesis of Keynesian 
message with the Freiburg imperative” (Synthese der Keynesianischen 
Botschaft mit dem Freiburger Imperativ). 
The turn of the sixties and seventies and the next d cade were character-
ized by a paradigm change – a shift towards monetarism and the renewal of 
conviction that the market mechanism could ensure fll employment, with 
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the support of efficient system of flexible prices. SPD never ruled with an 
absolute majority, so its coalition partners always slowed fuller implemen-
tation of Keynesian policies. Highly independent Bundesbank was manned 
by economists with monetarist inclination and taking over the position of 
finance minister after the resignation of Schiller in 1972 by H. Schmidt and 
his subsequent governance reversed Keynesian tendencies. German econ-
omists clearly emphasized that the country's economic problems are of 
a structural – not cyclical – nature, thus the use of Keynesian instruments 
was not justified. 
Since the late 1970s, after the experience of oil crises, there was a re-
turn to the idea of a policy of economic order (Ordnungspolitik). In the 
mid-80s the government of Chancellor Kohl referred to the origins of SME 
and postulated its renewal. In 1992 Kohl (1992, pp. 193-196) claimed that 
the post-war boom years have weakened the foundatios of economic order 
and the economy has become less resistant to crises, a  evidenced by the 
inability of curbing unemployment in the 70s. For Kohl a macroeconomic 
policy mistake was to underestimate the pernicious mpact of inflation on 
economic growth and employment, which leads to the conclusion about the 
impossibility of unrestrained influence over the economic situation. In the 
context of the crisis – according to Kohl – a consistent policy in the spirit of 
Erhard is reliable, which includes: 
− priority to the stability of the value of money, 
− sound public finances, 
− priority to generate income against its division, 
− prosperity for all, both entrepreneurs and employees. 
For Kohl, the SME was a proven concept, still up-to-date and worth de-
veloping. The state should not play a dominant rolein the labour market, 
and the German model of social partnership, in which tariff partners decide 
on pay and working conditions, contributes greatly to the efficient function-
ing of the economy and improvement in the labour maket. 
A number of trends and ideas contributed to limitation of the ac-
ceptance of the Keynesian concepts in Germany: 
− The fear that Keynesianism will contribute to the build-up of inflation-
ary pressures and lead to the intervention spiral. Inflation aversion was 
established by the hyperinflation of the 1920s. 
− Successful currency reform of 1948, which inaugurated the restrictive 
monetary policy of the independent Bundesbank. 
− The high acceptance for the model of industrial relations, highly auton-
omous of direct state intervention (Allen, 2005, pp. 204). 
− Reluctance to determine the numerical targets for ec nomic growth, 
typical for “hydraulic” version of Keynesianism. 
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− The dominance of conservative centre-right parties, long periods of 
governance and stability of personnel – a small staff rotation at the 
highest levels of government. 
The weakness of Keynesianism also stemmed from the fact that the in-
tellectual elite around the circle of Freiburg ordoliberals was able to create 
a convincing alternative that was based largely on the accumulated experi-




The Clash of Ideologies – the Main Areas of Conflict  
Between German and the Anglo-Saxon Approach 
 
The main areas of conflict between German and Anglo-Saxon economists 
can be reduced to a few points. These controversies are not always fully 
articulated, some can be treated as elements of the ideology1 deeply rooted 
in the subconscious mind, which filters the world perception. As Denzau 
and North (1994) explained, ideas and ideologies shape the subjective men-
tal structures through which individuals interpret the world and make eco-
nomic and political decisions. According to the well-known Keynes’ state-
ment, ideas have the powers that rule the world, therefore the awareness of 
these differences allow a deeper interpretation of the economists’ position 
in the German- and English-speaking countries. 
The following list (table 1.) should be considered as a set of stylized 
facts that may be of course subject of a separate discussion. Naturally, the 
dividing line between economists of German and Anglo-Saxon origin is 
conventional. The two groups are not fully homogeneous, and the differ-
ences nevertheless correspond to national boundaries. Inside the circles of 
German economists disputes are also being held regardin  the modern mac-
roeconomic policy in the face of the crisis, although P. Bofinger, a long 
year member of influential Council of Economic Experts, stated meaning-
fully, that he himself has been the last Keynesian in Germany (The Econo-
mist, 2015b). The list of differences neither explores deeper the well-
                                                 
1 J. Godłów-Legiędź (2014, p. 21-22) indicates that in the process of creation of eco-
nomic knowledge the worldview plays an important role. Systems of economic views, even 
considered as products of an objective reason and clled theories, take the form of ideology. 
On the basis of neoliberalism, Keynesianism and other concepts, the researchers are based 
on certain assumptions concerning the nature of economic phenomena, whose genuineness 
they cannot be quite sure of. For an economist going beyond the pure description and inter-
pretation of the studied phenomena in the direction of policy marks the transition from 
positive to normative economics, which is necessarily based on the elements of evaluation 
and assessment. 
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known points, dividing neoclassical and Keynesian ideas nor exposes the 




Table 1. The main areas of divergence between the German and Anglo-Saxon 
economics 
 
Area German economics Anglo-Saxon economics 
The preferred type of 
economic policy 
The primacy of policy of 
economic order 
Process policy 
Time horizon Long Short 
Policy basis Rules Discretion 
The objectives  
of economic policy 
Price stability The fight against  
unemployment 
Social security Complementary and not 
contradictory to the growth 
strategy 
Weakens the incentives for 
efficiency and growth 
The pace of economic 
growth 
Reluctance to setting numer-
ical goals 
The desired rate set as  
a goal 
Aggregation of economic 
categories 
Reluctance to aggregation, 
through which the structure 
is lost 
Aggregation as a transition 
from the micro to the macro 
level 
Achieving an economic 
equilibrium 
Helping to achieve an equi-
librium by coordination of 
the main social actors 
State intervention may be 
necessary to achieve  
a balance 
Anti-crisis policy* Structural reforms Fiscal or monetary expan-
sion 
The directions of public 
expenditure * 
Preference of investment to 
consumption 
Consumption as a motor for 
growth 
Interpretation of the 
surplus in the trade  
balance* 
Surplus as an expression of 
competitiveness 
The surplus as a result 
beggar-the-neighbour poli-
cy; debt of trading partners 
* In the case of German economic policy the elements of the process policy complement the 
policy of economic order.  
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
An important distinction having its roots in ordoliberalism is the distinc-
tion between the policy of economic order (Ordnungspolitik) and the pro-
cess policy (Prozesspolitik). According to the orthodox view of the Frei-
burg school the role of the state is to create an institutional framework for 
the economic process, rather than to interfere directly in this process with 
policy instruments. In this way a neoclassical belief becomes visible that 
the market mechanism is able to generate good results, if an appropriate 
institutional framework is created. The main ordering power is a mecha-
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nism of flexible prices and the strength of competition, best captured by the 
title of the American edition of the book of L. Erhard “Prosperity for all” 
translated as “Prosperity through competition”. Policy of economic order, 
by definition, is focused on the long term, and therefore requires consisten-
cy and patience. According to the ordoliberal thesis about the interdepend-
ence of economic phenomena (Interdependenzthese), all actions taken by 
the state to a greater or lesser extend impact on the overall economic order 
and should therefore be coherent and logically comple ent each other. 
Therefore, state interventions within the process policy should be kept to 
a minimum, and if already taken, only by measures consistent with the 
logic of the market (marktkonform). There is clearly recognizable diver-
gence between ordoliberal and Keynesian thinking, which by definition 
was focused on the short term, and monetarism alike, which also suggested 
the process policy, but more by means of monetary policy2. 
These differences are related to the desire of grounding policy on rules 
rather than discretionary decisions. An order rests upon the principles, and 
the rules structure the behaviour of market participants, stabilize expecta-
tions and increase market transparency. Examples of preference of rules-
based approach are visible both on the national leve and in the construction 
of an institutional order of the EU, which will be discussed below. 
A policy based on rules relates to the principle of responsibility, which 
in practice is manifested by the emphasis on the obligations of debtors, 
dislike of excessive debt, policy stability etc. The views grounded in the 
German economic thought in the days of the Freiburg school are still pre-
sent. In this context it is worth quoting the statement of Otmar Issing, 
a former chief economist of the Bundesbank and the ECB, provoked by an 
opinion of the special “systemic role of banks” in the economy. He stated 
that “If banks or states are not allowed to go bankrupt, principles of the 
market economy will be undermined. Who, therefore, put the whole system 
into question, has understood nothing.” Moreover, the market as a “discov-
ery procedure” must possess methods of rewarding effective behaviour and 
punishing failure (Issing, 2011). 
Another area of differences is the preference betwen the two “bads” in 
macroeconomic policy – inflation and unemployment. I flation aversion, 
inherited after the hyperinflation from the 1920s, led Germany to tolerating 
rather high unemployment, while conducting parallel restrictive monetary 
policy. Different preference is particularly important in the context of mon-
etary union with countries of Southern Europe, tradi ionally preferring low-
er unemployment. In the classic textbook De Grauwe (2005, pp. 13-15) 
                                                 
2 The resemblance between Keynesianism and monetarism on the area of the process 
policy is stressed by P. Pysz (2010, pp. 68-69). 
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raises this issue, pointing out that freezing the exchange rates in the mone-
tary union between such different countries like Germany and Italy narrows 
the choice between inflation and unemployment. Currency issues were in 
the centre of the Euckenian model of the competitiv economic order. The 
primacy of monetary policy constitutes its basic principle, since, as argued 
Eucken, it is impossible to build a competitive economic order without 
sound money. He cites (probably after Schumpeter) in this context a sen-
tence attributed to Lenin “in order to destroy bourgeois society you must 
debauch its money.” (Eucken, 2004, pp. 255). Prices mu t correctly fulfil 
the function of the measures of resources scarcity, and in addition they 
must be stable. Already quoted Issing (2000) clearly represents this position 
and associates price stability with the ECB independence and constant con-
cern about its credibility. Only the primacy of monetary policy can provide 
a stable euro, and hence successful European integration. 
With regard to the stimulating the economy during crises the Germans 
prefer to strengthen the supply side of the economy through investment and 
policy of economic order. It has to create a basis for long-term economic 
growth in contrast to short-term growth stimulation by consumption 
(Balcerzak & Rogalska, 2014, pp. 88-93; Balcerzak, 2008, pp. 181-204). In 
the German culture saving is a virtue, and how “The Economist” points out 
(2015), “…what others call “austerity”, Germans call Sparpolitik, “savings 
policy”, which has a much more positive connotation.” I  the background 
of such thinking is the Say’s law of markets, proclaiming that supply cre-
ates its own demand and the national income accounting savings-
investment identity. This strategy is complemented by the demand for 
structural reforms to increase the competitive potential of the economy, the 
emphasis on increased productivity that in turn determine the acceptable 
average wage growth (Balcerzak, 2009b, pp. 71-106). Linking wages with 
productivity has been postulated by the politics since the time of Erhard 
and strongly accented by the Bundesbank, trying to indirectly influence 
wage negotiations. An example of such wage self-discipl ne is an informal 
“pact for jobs” observed in 2000–2009 (Lesch, 2010), when unit labour 
costs remained stable, and effective wages developed in line with the pace 
set by the tariff partners. 
The strategy of export-led growth, implemented successfully by Germa-
ny, generating large surplus in the balance of trade nd current account 
balance, is interpreted by German economists as a sign of the competitive-
ness of goods “made in Germany”. By contrast, this strategy is subjected to 
criticism by the Anglo-American economists as a beggar-the-neighbor pol-
icy. Martin Wolf (2013) concluded that „…a large country with a huge 
structural current account surplus does not just export products. It also ex-
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ports bankruptcy and unemployment, particularly if the counterpart capital 
flow consists of short-term debt.” Similarly, the US Treasury (2013) criti-
cized Germany for maintaining too large surplus in the current account, 
“Germany has maintained a large current account surplus throughout the 
euro area financial crisis, and in 2012, Germany’s ominal current account 
surplus was larger than that of China. Germany’s anaemic pace of domestic 
demand growth and dependence on exports have hampered rebalancing at 
a time when many other euro-area countries have been under severe pres-
sure to curb demand and compress imports in order to p omote adjustment. 
The net result has been a deflationary bias for the euro area, as well as for 
the world economy.” 
In the ordoliberal tradition the economic growth has not been fetishized, 
it has obviously mattered, but as a category resultd from free economic 
process. Specifying in advance by the government a desired economic 
growth rate would be associated with constructivism. In Germany, econom-
ic growth as the goal of macroeconomic policy was adopted not until short 
period of flirting with the Keynesian ideology in the before mentioned Sta-
bilization and Growth Law in 1967. Operating on themacroeconomic ag-
gregates (e.g. global demand, total savings and investments), especially 
developed by Keynes and his followers, leads to a lss of specificity of 
individual market segments and bears the risk of missing problems of their 
correct structure, what already stressed Eucken and Röpke. According to 
M. Burda, this reluctance among German economists i still visible: 
“Ordoliberalism’s biggest flaw, lies in “failing to do the aggregation step. It 
is at heart a microeconomic model that disavows macroeconomic policy 
because it treats countries, or even an entire currency zone, as if they were 
individual households.” (The Economist, 2015b). 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries the generous social security system is of-
ten regarded as an obstacle in raising efficiency due to the weakening in-
centives, whereas in Germany since the time of Bismarck, it is assumed 
that the social capitalism helps to stabilize the social status of employees 
(Sennett, 2006, pp. 30-31). Complex coordination tools of the social part-
ners (the close links between the large companies and banks financing 
them, cooperation between employers' organizations and trade unions) sup-
port the market mechanism in achieving general economic equilibrium and 
sometimes in a more or less formal manner strengthe  government 
strategy. In contrast, Keynesian theory warily asses  the ability of the pri-
vate sector of the economy to achieve stability automatically, and this sec-
tor is considered as the source of fluctuations that destabilize the entire 
economy and lead to cyclical unemployment. 
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Some elements in German economic thinking are a legcy from the in-
dustrialization period of the nineteenth century. One can point a preference 
of investment as a source of economic growth, expanded model of social 
security complementary to growth strategy and a coordinated model of 
industrial relations. The survival of these fixed points for such a long period 
provides an indication of strong phenomenon of path dependence. 
In the German academic world, thinking in terms of economic order is 
still present and passed on to the next generation of economists. In the 
German standard textbooks on macroeconomics and political economy the 
issues of economic order are at least mentioned, while in their English 
counterparts – totally absent. 
Ordoliberal ideas are represented by a large part of the intellectual and 
political elites in Germany (Mączyńska & Pysz, 2014). The examples are: 
the German Central Bank, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and its Academic Advisory Board (Wissen-
schaftlicher Beirat), the Council of Economic Experts (Sachvestän-
digenrat) and industry and employers’ associations. From the outside, it 
may seem that ordoliberalism dominates the thinking of the German elite, 
but conservative circles, related to e.g. yearbook “ORDO” and the Walter 
Eucken Institute, are of the opinion that a far-reaching drift has taken place 
moving away the practice of economic policy from the original Erhard’s 
Social Market Economy. 
 
 
Practical Implications for Macroeconomic Policy  
in the Face of the Euro Zone Crisis 
 
Some of the outlined postulates of ordoliberal stream have been successful-
ly implemented at the European level. It can be exemplified by the institu-
tional framework of competition3 and monetary policy. For Germany the 
resignation of the D-Mark was conditioned by creation of institutional and 
functional copy of the Bundesbank by the ECB, especially its high degree 
of independence and objectives of monetary policy. The Bundesbank in 
Germany attached great importance to the issue of wages and tried to influ-
ence indirectly the wage bargaining. At the European l vel, the ECB does 
not have such tools except monetary policy tightening and thereby threaten-
ing to cause the unemployment. The problem are the lack of coordination 
                                                 
3 The impact of Eucken thought can be traced in the records of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community in 1957 relating to the competition rules in the Europe-
an common market, repeated later in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
in Lisbon in 2008. The influence is huge, but underrat d. 
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of monetary and fiscal policy, which remains in theresponsibility of mem-
ber states, and various forms of wage bargaining. That is why Germany 
sought to provide some patterns of behaviour of fiscal policy in a highly 
heterogeneous group of countries within the EU by imposing the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. The very design of mnetary union assumed 
to limit an excessive fiscal expansion by the Pact, on which Germany 
pushed. It can be assumed that for Germany it would not be necessary and 
was pushed through with a view to less disciplined countries. Although 
Germany was in a situation of an excessive deficit procedure in 2002–2007 
and 2009–2012, however, since budget year 2011 the public debt brake 
(Schuldenbremse) has operated written down in the Constitution. However, 
in the light of breaking the rules of the Pact, Germany pushed through the 
adoption of the fiscal compact, which is based on balanced budget rules, 
a debt brake rule and an automatic correction mechanism. Finally, the Trea-
ty of Maastricht enshrined the no-bail-out rule, which prohibits taking over 
responsibility for the debts of individual member states by the authorities of 
the EU and other member states. 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis disagreem nts have emerged 
about the mitigation of its consequences. A different vision of Germany on 
crisis management in the euro area meant that they have become particular-
ly evident. 
In Anglo-Saxon countries the teaching of Keynes returned (R. Skidelsky 
even titled his 2009 book “Keynes. Return of the Master”), but while in the 
US, both Republicans and Democrats implemented a stimulus package, in 
Germany this policy was introduced with considerable hesitation. Eventual-
ly, the federal government launched a package worth 50 billion euros in 
January 2009. Including the earlier program of tax cuts from autumn of 
2008 it was 80 billion, which must be regarded as an exceptionally strong 
reaction, considering that the federal government have practically never 
launched the typical expansionary Keynesian-style policies stimulating the 
economic situation4, regardless of whether it was about the national econ-
omy or the European economy. German reluctance to fiscal expansion has 
been criticized by many American economists, especially P. Krugman. 
                                                 
4 The period of transformation of the former German Democratic Republic can be con-
sidered as an exception. The process absorbed enormous resources from the federal budget 
and shifted the budget balance into the deficit and in the long run increased public debt by 
approx. 20 percentage points. As a result of this expenditure Germany came into recession 
later than other countries. Government spending was directed at rebuilding the infrastruc-
ture, thus they can be interpreted as strengthening the supply side of the economy, and not 
the deliberate stimulation of aggregate demand. 
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Germans are seen to have a position of hegemon and st biliser in Eu-
rope, but in the face of the crisis German politicians stressed the need for 
self-responsibility of each country and reluctantly accepted the role of a 
leader. Relatively weak domestic demand inhibits the role of the growth 
engine for the countries of Southern Europe (Poirson & Weber, 2011). 
Some authors claim that the benefits for Germany from participating in the 
euro area are so high that in their own interest Germany should financially 
help in real adjustments the Eurozone countries that have problems, and 
that previously constituted market for German goods (Posen, 2011). After 
creating a monetary union, countries of the south fell into a kind of debt 
trap, lured by the progressive convergence of nominal interest rates, which 
were falling to the German level. 
The view repeatedly expressed by Germany, that the cause of the prob-
lems in southern European countries, especially Greece, are of a structural 
nature, therefore structural adjustments are needed (Schäuble, 2015), be-
came the subject of criticism by the IMF (2013), according to which the 
level of adjustment is too high. Germans after 25 years of financing of the 
former GDR are very sceptical about the success of upporting other coun-
tries, especially if there are large structural mismatches. The unification 
entailed reforms that the public associate with sacrifices, cuts in wages and 
changes in the labour market. Having experienced such problems make 
Germans expect readiness for sacrifice from the othrs5. Moreover, a simi-
lar approach is also represented by the Baltic States nd Slovakia, whose 
small open economies linked to the euro have survived the acute recession 
since 2008. Impossibility of nominal exchange rate devaluation forced 
them to painful internal devaluation. The weak euro due to the crisis im-
proved situation in the German trade balance and on the labour market, and 
therefore there was no need to take exceptional measur s to stimulate the 
economy. 
The main line of argument of the German decision-makers can be sum-
marised as follows: wasteful and undisciplined governments will not be 
able to keep a balanced budget during the boom, which restricts their room 
for manoeuvre during the recession. There is no guarantee that the support 
bailout substantially changes their behaviour. This means the moral hazard 
at the expense of German taxpayers, which would be contrary to the Ger-
man constitution. The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht), empowered and with great authority, signalled its objections 
to the proposed transfer of competences in the area of fiscal supranational 
level. This represents a significant obstacle to the possible taking over fi-
                                                 
5 Such a hypothesis is put forward by A. Newman (2015, pp. 117-135.)  
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nancial commitments of other countries6. That is why Germany did not 
agree to issue Eurobonds, or to provide joint guarantees for financial assis-
tance. These arguments clearly expounded Finance Minister W. Schäuble 
(2012), who stated: “Moral hazard is not benign. Setting the wrong incen-
tives would mean stabbing reformist governments in the back. By suggest-
ing that uncompetitive economic structures can endure, we would buoy the 
populists (…). By discouraging reform, we would not s lve Europe's im-
balances but make them permanent. (…) If we want to maintain such 
a level of protection in a rapidly changing world, we must ask ourselves 
where the wealth to sustain it will come from. Not fr m a euro-zone budg-
et, the printing press or Eurobonds. All of our economies, not just a few, 
will have to generate this wealth, and they can only do so if they adapt to 
the rigors of a hyper-competitive world economy. Prosperity is not a God-
granted right – it must be earned.” In this context Schäuble has the full 
support of the Bundesbank, whose President, J. Weidmann, often refers to 
Eucken, the main ordoliberal thinker, and translate th  principle of respon-
sibility for the functioning of the institutional order of the euro area. 
Weidmann (2012) voiced criticism, among others, about ECB policy eas-
ing, consisting in buying up securities of dubious quality, what raises the 
question of possible joint responsibility of member states, especially in the 
absence of appropriate control mechanisms at EU level. According to him 
accountability and control are of crucial importance for the institutional 
framework of monetary union. 
Schäuble also represents the position of the majority f German econo-
mists on monetary policy when he warns “that monetary policy cannot 
substitute for fiscal and structural reforms in memb r countries (…). Mone-
tary policy can only buy time.” (Schäuble 2015). Minister's consistent atti-
tude enjoys a high degree of recognition in society, and his policy was sup-






The conducted analysis of the importance of ordoliberal thinking in post-
war Germany argues that it has had a tremendous impact on the shape of 
the economic order of Social Market Economy as wellas on macroeconom-
ic policy. The real influence of Keynesianism as the main competitive doc-
                                                 
6 In 2012 H.-W. Sinn, a leading German economist, declar d himself as ordoliberal, ini-
tiated an open letter signed by 172 professors of ec nomics who warned about extending 
liability for the state debts „Frankfurter Allgemein  Zeitung” (2012). 
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trine had persisted for only a short period of time and did not become the 
dominant school of thought among the German elite. 
Historically conditioned ordoliberalism domination, or at least its ele-
ments, in the German economy raises a lot of differences in views between 
German and Anglo-Saxon economists, or more broadly, from the “rest of 
the world”, on how the economy really works, the role f the state and its 
macroeconomic policy. 
Disagreements highlighted by the financial crisis and the crisis in the 
euro area lead to specific decisions (or the lack of them) at the levels of 
national and European economies. It is unlikely that ese differences will 
be quickly balanced out. This raises legitimate concer s about the euro 
zone, which has always been a political project, and its construction does 
not take sufficient account of the achievements of economic theory7. Such 
situation that Greece happened to be trapped into was also not foreseen, 
thus, the procedures for leaving the euro zone were not established. This 
means that politics and economics will grapple with these challenges for 
a long time, and the intellectual base of discussion on the German side will 
still be set, consciously or subconsciously, by the ordoliberal ideology. 
The course of future discussion emerged in July 2015. Minister Schäu-
ble proposes to reduce some of the powers of the European Commission 
(enforcement of the EU law implementation, supervision of the common 
market), handing them over to the independent state agencies modelled on 
the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). It would be a mani-
festation of the so-called “regulatory capitalism” (Braithwaite, 2008), 
a fairly typical German solution. He argues that the Commission cannot be 
both “Guardian of the Treaties” and act according to EU rules, and, on the 
other hand, to pursue a discretionary policy like a government (Frankfurter, 
2015). President Hollande's proposal to deepen integration through the 
creation of government for the euro zone, fiscal and political union (Wie-
gel, 2015) raises the question of on what basis should it resist. In the con-
text of analysed ideological differences it would be questionable. One 
commentator expressed it as follows: “The differences between the German 
ordoliberal concept of fiscal policy and the French Keynesian one are irrec-
oncilable. Berlin wants a watertight system of rules that strips policymakers 
of discretion, whereas for Paris economic and politica  discretion are para-
mount. (...). But ordoliberalism cannot work as a governing principle for 
a currency union with different intellectual traditions and divergent econo-
mies.” (Legrain, 2015). 
                                                 
7 It is mainly about the convergence criteria, which does not have much in common with 
the theory of optimum currency areas. Germany in the 90s put a lot of emphasis on meeting 
the convergence criteria as a condition for entry into the monetary union. 
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The desire to base economic policy on rules becomes more understand-
able, considering the federal structure of Germany. The more the constitu-
tion of the country concerned is similar to the federation, the more rules are 
needed for its proper operation8. It is worth noting that the historical cases 
of federal countries meeting with the economic success were associated 
with a stable, rules-based monetary policy. At the end of the twentieth cen-
tury these were: the US, Germany and Switzerland. Since the structure of 
the monetary union in many ways is a federal one, expectations of Germa-
ny, to develop it on the basis of rules becomes more understandable. 
M. Burda, the American economist working for years in Berlin, said that 
“Ordoliberalism is not very practical, it’s religion” (The Economist, 
2015b). From the perspective of Germany one can respond with a title of 
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